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SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
terminated, the lessee was allowed recovery of damages from
Western Union measured by the loss attributable to the delay in the
delivery of the money order telegram.
Richard S. Woods.
PERSONAL PROPERTY
DAMAGES-NON-WILFUL CONVERSION OF TIMBER
Arkansas. The case of Burbridge v. Bradley Lumber Company'
was an action for damages for conversion of timber. Defendant
lumber company, under an honest but mistaken belief of owner-
ship, entered land belonging to plaintiff and removed and con-
verted to lumber some 500,000 board feet of timber. The market
value of the stumpage, i.e., the timber standing in the tree, was
$4.50 per thousand board feet, and the cost of converting the
timber into lumber was $11.61 per thousand. The finished prod-
uct, lumber, had a market value of $25 per thousand. Both
parties claimed they were entitled to the net profit of $8.89 per
thousand.
The court discussed two conflicting rules of damages that had
been applied in Arkansas in such cases. The two rules had caused
considerable confusion and were identified as the Eaton rule and
the United States rule.
The Eaton rule was followed in this case. The rule, as estab-
lished by the case of Eaton v. Langley,2 provides that the measure
of damages is the value of the wood in its manufactured state,
less the cost of the converter's labor and expenditures, provided
that such expenses do not exceed the increase in value, in which
event the plaintiff would be entitled to the value of the property
as lumber less the increase in value.
The effect of this rule is to give the original owner whatever
S......... Ark- ------ 239 S. W. 2d 285 (1951).
2 65 Ark. 448, 47 S. W. 123, 126 (1898).
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increase in value there may have been over and above the actual cost
of manufacture. The principal reason given by the court for its
decision was that the Eaton case stated the "wisest and most just"
rule. Several cases were cited as supporting the Eaton rule.8
The United States rule, which seems to be the more generally
accepted rule, is to assess as damages the value of the goods as
of the time and place of the conversion. This rule, of course,
assumes the conversion to be innocent. Applied in this case, the
rule would give the original owner only the stumpage value of the
timber, allowing the converter whatever profit has resulted from
his conversion. Several Arkansas cases are cited in the principal
decision as supporting this rule.4
The Eaton rule appears to be the more just because if the United
States rule is followed, the injury inflicted by the trespasser is
borne in part by the innocent owner. The latter is deprived of the
opportunity to make a profit on the thing converted. "Such a doc-
trine, as said by Chief Justice Cooley, 'offers a premium to heed-
lessness and blunders, and a temptation by false evidence to give
an intentional trespasser the appearance of an innocent mistake.' "'
An exception to the Eaton rule will probably be made where the
cost of conversion and the value added are "out of all proportion
to the value of the original article."6 A leading authority cites.
the Eaton case and indicates that an increase of more than six
hundred per cent may be sufficient increment in value to permit
acquisition of a new title by the converter. "The idea seems to be
3 Bailey v. Hammonds, 193 Ark. 633, 101 S. W. 2d 785, 786 (1937) ; Brown and
Hackney v. Daubs, 139 Ark. 53, 213 S. W. 4 (1919) ; Bradley Lumber Co. v. Hamilton,
117 Ark. 127, 173 S. W. 848 (1915) ; Randleman v. Taylor, 94 Ark. 511, 127 S. W. 723
(1910) ; Central Coal & Coke Co. v. John Henry Shoe Co., 69 Ark. 302, 63 S. W. 49
(1901).
4 Jones v. Vaughan, 184 Ark. 174, 41 S. W. 2d 986 (1931) ; Augusta Cooperage Co.
v. Black, 153 Ark. 133, 239 S. W. 760 (1922) ; Bunch v. Pittman, 123 Ark. 127, 184 S. W.
850 (1916); Foreman v. G. D. Holloway & Son, 122 Ark. 341, 183 S. W. 763 (1916)
United States v. Flint Lumber Co., 87 Ark. 80, 112 S. W. 217 (1908).
5 239 S. W. 2d at 288.
a Ibid.
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that it must be sufficiently great to make an award of title to the
owner of the materials 'gross injustice at the first blush.' -7
CONDITIONAL SALES
Louisiana. The case of Roy 0. Martin Lumber Company v. Sin-
clair involved two conditional sales of movable property. The
property in question, which plaintiff vendor had sequestrated, was
a caterpillar tractor, three motors, two mules, two horses and two
trailers. Plaintiff alleged it was the owner of the property and
attached the two conditional sales contracts to its petition. As set
out by the agreements, the fixed selling price of the tractor was
$4,375.57, while the price of the other movables was $3,783.14.
The contract for purchase of the tractor was, in substance, that
the vendor agreed to sell and the vendee agreed to buy, for the
fixed selling price ($4,375.57) to be paid by the vendee at $1.50
per thousand board feet for all logs delivered to the vendor's
plant. It provided for weekly settlements, and the amount due the
vendee for the hauling was to be credited on the purchase price.
A similar arrangement was made for purchase of the other mov-
ables. A $624 balance had not been paid at the time the property
was sequestered.
The court affirmed the dissolution of the sequestration and
allowed the defendant $1,200 damages, which amount was not
regarded as excessive considering the loss of the use of the prop-
erty for several days, attorneys' fees, and the cost of obtaining a
surety. The reason for the decision was that Louisiana will not
enforce a conditional sale, i.e., a sale where the vendee is uncon-
ditionally bound for the purchase price and the vendor is to remain
the owner of the property until the price is paid. The court cited
several decisions to this effect.9 A leading case states very clearly
7 BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY (1936) § 24.
8 220La. 226, 56 S. W. 2d 240 (1951).
'Thomas v. Philip Werlein, Ltd., 181 La. 104, 158 So. 635 (1935) ; Byrd v. Cooper,
166 La. 402, 117 So. 441 (1928) ; Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. St. Louis Cypress Co.,
121 La. 152, 46 So. 193 (1908).
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Louisiana's view toward conditional sales. "A so-called conditional
sale, or sale by which the vendee is to become at once uncondition-
ally bound for the price and the vendor is to continue to be the
owner of the property until the price is paid, is not possible under
the laws of this state. A petition wherein the vendor under such
a contract claims the ownership of the property sold shows no
cause of action."' Under the Louisiana Civil Code a sale cannot
be accomplished unless title passes. The manifest intention of the
parties in these agreements is that there should be a sale, and the
stipulation of continued ownership is held inconsistent with that
intention. The seller's remedy in Louisiana is to enforce his ven-
dor's lien or to sue for dissolution of the sale."
It was held that the method by which, or the time when, the pur-
chase price was to be paid should not be controlling in the prin-
cipal case. An absolute agreement to purchase and sell for a fixed
purchase price was imposed on the parties. Plaintiff was not
allowed to assert that the sequestration should be upheld on the
basis of his vendor's lien because he had made the inconsistent
claim of ownership in his petition.
LIMITATION ON LIABILITY-BAILEE FOR HIRE
Oklahoma. Fisk v. Bullard2 is a case which held a transporta-
tion company liable as a bailee for hire for loss of a bag which
had been checked after plaintiff had completed his trip. Plaintiff
boarded a bus operated by defendant transportation company in
Oklahoma City and upon arrival in Holdenville checked his bag
by delivering it to defendant Fisk. He was given a check which
recited that the storage charge was ten cents per day and that
"liability of this check [was] not to exceed $25.00." Next day
plaintiff returned to the bus station and found that the portion of
the tag issued to him which had been retained by defendant Fisk
10 Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. St. Louis Cypress Co., 121 La. 152, 46 So. 193 (1908).
The statement is found in the syllabus prepared by the court.
11 LA. CiV. CODE (Dart, 1945) Arts. 2561, 2564, 3227.
12 ...... Okla --------- 239 P. 2d 424 (1951).
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was placed upon the wrong bag. At the suggestion of Fisk, who
made out a claim for him, plaintiff negotiated with the claim agent
of defendant transportation company. All this was to no avail, and
plaintiff brought suit. Among the defenses of the transportation
company was the contention that the limitation of liability on the
checkroom tag was valid.
The court stated that it had held that a warehouseman or bailee
for hire could not limit its liability for the loss of property held
by it."8 The opinion does not touch upon whether or not a sufficient,
actual notice of limitation of liability would be effective. Ordi-
narily a bailee and bailor can agree to limit liability if there is a
conscious meeting of the minds on the point. In the absence of
conscious agreement it seems fair that the bailee should be liable
for the full value of the thing bailed if it is of the class of article
he holds himself out as accepting for bailment.
LIABILITY OF BAILEE-PRESUMPTIONS
Texas. The case of Trammell v. Whitlock" was a bailor-bailee
controversy over damage to a cargo trailer. Plaintiff bailor made
an express oral agreement with defendant bailee for the loan of a
trailer for ten days, and defendant agreed to return it in as good
order as when received, except for usual wear and tear. The agree-
mnt was for the mutual benefit of the parties. Delivery to the
bailee was established inasmuch as the court found that the trailer
was left parked in front of defendant's place of business and
under one of defendant's trucks. Plaintiff was later told the trailer
was damaged in a wreck and that defendant would repair it, but
no repairs were made and plaintiff repossessed it off a trailer lot.
Actually, the bailee had loaned the trailer to an employee whose
brother wrecked it in Arkansas. No proof as to how the wreck
occurred was offered. Only a single issue of liability was sub-
mitted based on the contract.
13 Citing Oklahoma City Hotel v. Levine, 189 Okla. 331, 116 P. 2d 997 (1941).
14 ------ Tex ---------- 242 S. W. 2d 157 (1951).
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The court stated that it would be erroneous to say that under
such agreement the bailee was an insurer of the trailer. Liability
must rest on a failure to exercise reasonable care for the bailed
article, as in the usual case of a bailment for mutual benefit. If,
assuming the fact of bailment, evidence presented a fact question
of negligence, then the mere finding of bailment would not support
a judgment for the plaintiff; but if, on the same assumption, the
record compelled the conclusion of negligence, judgment should
have been rendered for the plaintiff. Here the record compelled
the conclusion of negligence because the bailee's explanation, con-
sisting of the mere fact of the wreck of the trailer in the hands of
someone else associated with him (though not an employee) was
no more of an explanation than if the bailee simply said he did
not know how the trailer came to be damaged. The inference was
that the bailee wrongfully let the trailer out of his possession, and
this strengthened rather than destroyed the existing presumption of
negligence.
As to the burden of proof, the whole case rests on the bailor,
but when goods have been lost or returned in a damaged condi-
tion, and the bailee's liability depends on his negligence, the fact
of negligence may be presumed, and the bailee will have to
show other cause for the loss. The bailee is in a better position to
explain the loss. These principles are supported by the weight of
authority. 15
But it is well to note that the presumption spoken of is not a
true presumption. As pointed out by Judge Learned Hand in
Alpine Forwarding Company v. Pennsylvania Railroad Corn-
pany,"6 "The presumption on which the bailor may rely is a mere
rule for the conduct of the trial. It puts upon the bailee the risk
of a directed verdict if he does not meet it, but does no more;
once he has done so, it disappears from the case. Thus, it can
15 See cases collected in 8 C. J. S., Bailments, § 50, n. 87; 6 AM. Jun., Bailments,
§ 371, n. 17. And see Rhodes v. McDonald, 41 Tex. 478, 172 S. W. 2d 972 (1943);
Rhodes v. Turner, 171 S. W. 2d 208 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943); Callihan v. Montrief, 71
S. W. 2d 564 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934).
16 60 F. 2d 734, 736 (2d Cir. 1932).
